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Abstract
When two retinally adjacent image regions both claim ‘ownership’ of their common boundary based on different visual cues,
their perceptual competition could result in: (1) cue averaging, in which the common boundary is not strongly perceived as owned
by either region, or (2) perceptual bistability, in which the competing interpretations alternate in conscious perception over time.
We report that when the perception of one or another illusory surface depends on the outcome of such a competition, the
alternative percepts primarily exhibit bistability rather than averaging (or mutual weakening). More generally, we suggest that
mutually inconsistent perceptual interpretations of sensory data will tend to exhibit bistability to the extent that they require
significant constructive activity by vision. When one interpretation is more ‘literal’ (i.e. less constructive), it will tend to block
alternative percepts. Put somewhat differently, when competing visual cues specify different preferred (but not necessary)
interpretations, then the likely perceptual outcome is bistability rather than cue averaging. However, inconsistent visual cues can
also result in perceptual bistability if the interpretations they specify are so incommensurable that simply averaging them would
not provide useful information for perception. © 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Contours seen in image regions that do not contain
any corresponding physical gradients are called illusory
contours (ICs). A typical example is the Kanizsa square
(Kanizsa, 1974) shown in Fig. 1a, where an illusory
white square is seen partially occluding four black
disks. Kanizsa (1955) proposed that IC perception is a
manifestation of the Gestalt principle of pragnanz, spe-
cifically a preference for symmetry in the units of
perceptual organization. He suggested that the IC in
Fig. 1b is weak because the symmetry of the cross-
shaped inducers would be reduced if they were per-
ceived to be partially occluded and to amodally
complete behind the illusory square. He contrasted this
stimulus with that in Fig. 1a, in which perceptual
symmetry is enhanced by amodal completion of the
‘pacmen’ into complete disks.
It is known that nearby image contours that are
approximately parallel tend to be grouped as belonging
(Koffka, 1935) to the region that lies between them.
Metzger (1953) and Rock (1983) showed that paral-
lelism can affect figure/ground perception (Fig. 2). Thus
the black regions are more likely to appear figural than
the white regions in Fig. 2a, whereas the reverse is true
in Fig. 2b. Albert (1993) suggested that the perceptual
strength of an illusory surface perceived to partially
occlude its inducers might be influenced by parallelism,
as follows: When part of an inducer’s outer boundary is
nearby and approximately parallel to an inducing edge,
then the inducing edge will tend to be perceived as
belonging to the inducer. Because of the ‘one-sidedness’
of border ownership (Nakayama, Shimojo, & Silverman,
1989; Nakayama & Shimojo, 1992), the tendency for
such an inducing edge to be seen as belonging to an
illusory surface would be correspondingly reduced,
weakening the illusory surface percept. This suggests
that the illusory surface seen in Fig. 1a is stronger than
that seen in Fig. 1b because the inducers in Fig. 1b have
outer contours that are more nearly parallel to their
inducing edges than the inducers in Fig. 1a (see Fig. 3).
However, other explanations for the difference be-
tween the strengths of the ICs seen in Fig. 1a,b are
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possible. Williams and Rubin (1998) pointed out that
each inducer in Fig. 1b can sometimes be seen as two
overlapping rectangles (a horizontal one and a vertical
one) rather than as a unitary cross-shaped figure. When
this perceptual self-segmentation occurs, ICs complete
the boundary of the nearer rectangle, while the more
distant rectangle is ‘amodally’ completed behind the
nearer rectangle. Williams and Rubin (1998) hypothe-
sised that this self-segmentation might compete with the
illusory square and thus weaken it. As with parallelism,
this competition can be understood in terms of the
one-sidedness of border ownership: Self-segmentation
entails that the inducing edges of the potential illusory
square must be ‘owned’ by the overlapping rectangles,
rather than by the illusory square. The inducer segmen-
tation (IS) hypothesis is the hypothesis that inducer
self-segmentation greatly weakens an illusory surface.
In particular, the IS hypothesis suggests that inducer
self-segmentation is the primary reason why the illusory
square seen in Fig. 1b is weaker than the one seen in
Fig. 1a.
2. Experiments
To investigate the IS hypothesis we constructed a
number of new displays in which, as in Fig. 1b, there is
a tendency for the inducers to perceptually segment
into overlapping surfaces. If the IS hypothesis is cor-
rect, then one would expect that the strength of a
central illusory square would be negatively correlated
with strength of the self-segmentation of its inducers.
3. Observers
Observers were faculty, staff, graduate students, un-
dergraduate students, and visitors in the Psychology
Department at Harvard University. All were naive with
regard to the purpose of the experiments, and received
no payment for their participation.
4. Stimuli
The stimuli were presented full-screen on a 17 Apple
Vision computer monitor controlled by an Apple 8600/
120 computer. Viewing distance was approximately 0.8
m. Each experiment consisted of two parts: the first
part was a paired comparison task. In Experiments 1, 3,
4 and 5, pairs of illusory contour displays were pre-
sented side-by-side, and observers judged which display
had the stronger target illusory figure. In Experiment 2
pairs of indiidual inducers from the illusory figure
displays in Experiment 1 were presented side-by-side,
and observers judged which inducer gave the stronger
perceptual self-segmentation into overlapping figures.
In the second part of each experiment, all stimuli used
in the first part were presented simultaneously on the
computer monitor, and the observer provided a magni-
tude estimation for the strength of each target illusory
figure (Experiments 1, 3, 4 and 5), or inducer self-seg-
mentation (Experiment 2).
5. Methods
Observers used the arrow keys on a computer key-
board to indicate their responses in the paired compari-
Fig. 1. Kanizsa suggested that the IC seen in (b) is weaker than the
one in (a) because amodal continuation of the cross-shaped inducers
in (b) underneath an illusory square would reduce the symmetry of
the inducers, whereas amodal completion the pac-men in (a) into
disks would enhance their symmetry.
Fig. 2. Rock (1983) and Metzger (1953) noted a tendency for vision
to group parallel (or approximately parallel) contours as belonging to
the region that lies between them. Albert (1993) suggested that
parallelism might also affect IC perception (after Rock, 1983).
Fig. 3. Albert (1993) suggested that the tendency to group parallel (or
approximately parallel) contours as ‘belonging’ to the region that lies
between them might be more important than symmetry in explaining
why the IC in Fig. 1b is weaker than the IC in Fig. 1a. The image
contours in (b) labeled ‘Parallel’ are approximately parallel, whereas
those in (a) labeled ‘Not Parallel’ are much less parallel. Because of
this we tend to perceive the inducing edges in (b) as ‘belonging’ to the
inducers themselves (i.e. the black regions) rather than the potential
illusory figure. This weakens the central illusory square seen in (b)
compared to the one seen in (a).
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Fig. 4. The stimuli used in Experiment 1.
perceptual self-segmentation (Experiment 2) in each
experiment individually, and to assign a ‘0’ to a stimu-
lus only if the illusory figure or perceptual self-segmen-
tation was not perceptible.
6. Experiment 1
In Experiment 1 nine observers judged the relative
strengths of the central illusory squares seen in the
stimuli shown in Fig. 4. In each of these displays there
is some tendency to perceive the inducers as consisting
of two overlapping surfaces, rather than a single, uni-
tary surface. We reasoned that if the IS hypothesis is
correct, then the strength ratings for these illusory
squares should be negatively correlated with the
strength ratings for self-segmentation of their inducers
(measured in Experiment 2). Note that the IC strength
for Fig. 4a would be predicted to be relatively weak on
the basis of parallelism (Albert, 1993), whereas Fig.
4b–d would not. Casual inspection suggests that Fig.
4b–d produce relatively strong ICs, and our data
confirm this.
6.1. Results
In the paired comparison task all observers perceived
a weaker illusory square in Fig. 4a than in Fig. 4b–d.
Their mean magnitude ratings are shown in Fig. 5. A
single factor ANOVA on the rating data showed that
the effect of the figure was significant (F(3, 32)=21.28,
P0.01), and planned comparisons between the rat-
ings for Fig. 4a,b, Fig. 4a,c, and Fig. 4a,d were all
significant (P0.01). Thus, Fig. 4a produces a much
weaker illusory square than Fig. 4b–d.
7. Experiment 2
In Experiment 2 nine observers judged the relative
strength of the percept that an individual inducer in
Fig. 4 consisted of two overlapping surfaces (inducer
self-segmentation), rather than a single unitary surface.
The stimuli for this experiment are shown in Fig. 6.
7.1. Results
In the paired comparison task all observers rated the
inducer self-segmentation percept as weaker in Fig. 6a
than in Fig. 6b–d. Their mean ratings are shown in
Fig. 7. A single factor ANOVA on the rating data
showed that the effect was significant (F(3, 32)=17.08,
P0.01), and planned comparisons between the rat-
ings for Fig. 6a and each of Fig. 6b–d were all signifi-
cant (all P0.01). Thus, Fig. 6a produces a weaker
perception of self-segmentation than Fig. 6b–d.
Fig. 5. Results for Experiment 1.
Fig. 6. The stimuli used in Experiment 2.
Fig. 7. Results for Experiment 2.
son part of each experiment. In the magnitude estima-
tion task they assigned each stimulus a rating between
0 and 10. They were instructed to assign a ‘10’ to the
strongest illusory figure (Experiments 1, 3, 4 and 5) or
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8. Discussion of Experiments 1 and 2
Experiments 1 and 2 show that Fig. 4a produces a
weaker illusory square than Fig. 4b–d, and yet Fig. 6a
produces a weaker perception of self-segmentation than
Fig. 6b–d. Thus, it appears unlikely that the weakness
of the illusory square in Fig. 4a is primarily due to
border-ownership competition between the illusory
square percept and the inducer self-segmentation per-
cept. The results demonstrate that it is possible to
produce strong ICs with inducers that also produce
strong illusory self-segmentation. A Pearson r showed a
positive correlation (r=0.59) between the rating data
in Experiments 1 and 2, rather than the negative corre-
lation suggested by the IS hypothesis.
However, consider the possibility that some degree of
bistability exists in observer’s perceptions of the stimuli
in Fig. 4 such that the percept of inducer self-segmenta-
tion and the percept of a central illusory square are
negatively correlated in their relative strengths over
time: When one percept is strong the other is relatively
weak. If this kind of bistability is present, then the
claim that the two alternative border-ownership per-
cepts tend not to occur simultaneously is still tenable
(at least partly). This claim might be described as a
‘weak’ form of the IS hypothesis.
9. Perceptual competition
There are at least two different kinds of perceptual
phenomena that have been taken to be manifestations
of perceptual competition. First, there is cue averaging,
in which conflicting visual cues are combined via a
weighted average to construct a final percept that is
relatively stable over time. For example, depth aerag-
ing is often obtained when binocular stereopsis is pitted
against motion parallax or pictorial depth cues. Second,
there is perceptual multistability. For example, when
viewing a Necker cube our perception alternates be-
tween a percept of a cube viewed from above and a
cube viewed from below. We never see both percepts
simultaneously. Nor do we see a significant degree of
depth averaging, which would make the figure appear
relatively flat. In each perceptual state the cube appears
to be roughly as depthful as it does when viewing an
unambiguous line-drawing of a cube.
What stimulus conditions determine whether conflict-
ing cues will result in multistable perception as opposed
to cue averaging or mutual weakening of the alternative
percepts? We suggest that when a stimulus has no
perceptual interpretations that are fully consistent with
all of the salient image data, but the conflicting inter-
pretations are not too inconsistent, then cue averaging
will occur. However, if the conflicting interpretations
are very different, then multistability will occur (e.g.
when the image seen by the left eye is very different
from the image seen the right eye, binocular rivalry
results). On the other hand, when a stimulus has more
than one perceptual interpretation that is consistent
with all of the salient image data, then multistability
will occur. For example, the vertices of a Necker cube
may be seen as either concave or convex, although
vision ‘prefers’ to see any individual vertex as convex.
In other words, two cues will tend to cause bistability
when the conflict between them is such that one cue
favors percept A but is also consistent with percept B
(although B is less preferred), while the other cue favors
percept B but is also consistent with percept A (al-
though A is less preferred). However, as mentioned
above, inconsistent visual cues can also result in percep-
tual bistability, rather than cue averaging, if the inter-
pretations they specify are so different that averaging
them would not be useful. For example, averaging (e.g.,
morphing) an image of a house with an image of a face
would be unlikely to produce any useful information.
In the next experiment we sought evidence that per-
ceptual bistability could help to explain why Fig. 4b–d
produced both strong inducer self-segmentation and
strong illusory squares. In other words, we sought
evidence that there was some degree of bistability be-
tween inducer self-segmentation and the illusory square.
Some of the stimuli for Experiment 3 were constructed
by modifying Fig. 4b and Fig. 4d so that the inducers
no longer had homogeneous colour. Each inducer in
these stimuli for Experiment 3 consisted of two overlap-
ping figures with different gray-levels. The logic behind
this experiment is that if bistability between the illusory
square percept and the inducer segmentation percept is
present in the stimuli of Experiment 1, then it might be
possible to ‘clamp’ this perceptual alternation by mak-
ing the inducer segmentation more ‘literal’ in the stimu-
lus. This would result in unambiguous ownership of the
critical inducing edges by the inducers, since the percep-
tion of overlapping surfaces would now be part of the
literal percept (Rock, 1987). We reasoned that this kind
of literal percept might be more difficult to suppress
than a more constructive one based on ICs, and that
the perception of illusory squares in Figs. 8a, 10a,b
would therefore be weakened relative the other stimuli
in Experiment 3 (also see Spehar, 2000).Fig. 8. Stimuli used in Experiment 3.
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Fig. 9. Stimuli used in Experiment 3.
comparisons between the ratings for pairs of stimuli,
one stimulus from Fig. 9a–b and one from Fig. 9c–d,
were all significant (P0.01). Thus, the stimuli with
non-homogeneous inducers generated weaker illusory
squares than those with homogenous inducers. More-
over, it is known that ICs are readily generated by
spatially separated inducers of opposite contrast polar-
ity (Prazdny, 1983; Shapley & Gordon, 1983), so this
does not explain the weakness of the ICs in Figs. 8a,
and Figs. 9a,b.
10.2. Discussion
As suggested above, even if we grant that inducer
self-segmentation and the central illusory square are
mutually exclusive percepts, it does not logically follow
that both percepts will be weakened in a time-invariant
manner. Their competition could result in bistable per-
ception in which the dominant percept at any particular
instant will be almost as strong as it would be if the
stimulus were unambiguous.
Indeed, the depth ordering of the overlapping figures
seen during inducer self- segmentation is also ambigu-
ous; sometimes one surface will appear in front while at
other times the other surface will appear in front. Each
percept is strong at certain instants of time and com-
pletely absent at other instants of time (Kellman &
Shipley, 1991). For example, each inducer in Fig. 1b
can be seen as a vertical rectangle overlaying a horizon-
tal one, or vice-versa.
The reader may ask why the influence of ‘parallelism’
should not also manifest itself as bistability, rather than
as mutual weakening (Albert, 1993)? As suggested
above, a possible explanation is that the percept of
overlapping rectangles involves substantial constructive
activity, since the visual system must generate the illu-
sory contours to modally complete the boundary of the
nearer rectangle and amodally complete the farther
rectangle. On the other hand, parallelism is a more
literal feature of the stimulus, analogous to the overlap
percepts in Fig. 8a and Fig. 9a,b. Thus, parallelism
might be expected to ‘clamp’ the illusory square percept
at a weak strength level.
Returning to Experiment 3, it is possible that the
weakening of the target ICs in the figures with non-ho-
mogeneous inducers (Fig. 8a and Fig. 9a,b) is simply
due to the change in luminance contrast along the
inducing edges within each inducer. To control for this
possibility we conducted Experiment 4 (also see Kell-
man & Loukides, 1987; Spehar, 2000).
11. Experiment 4
In this experiment illusory disks were produced by
non-homogeneous inducers that did not appear to be
Fig. 10. Results for Experiment 3.
10. Experiment 3
Nine observers judged the relative strengths of the
illusory squares in Figs. 8 and 9.
10.1. Results
In paired comparisons all observers perceived the
illusory squares induced by the non-homogeneous in-
ducers as weaker than those induced by the homoge-
nous inducers. Their mean magnitude ratings are
shown in Fig. 10. A single factor ANOVA on the rating
data for the stimuli in Fig. 8 showed that the effect was
significant (F(3, 32)=23.32, P0.01), and planned
comparisons between the ratings for Fig. 8a and each
of Fig. 8b–d were all significant (P0.01). Similarly
for Fig. 9 (F(3, 32)=49.26, P0.01), and planned
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composed of overlapping figures that ‘owned’ the in-
ducing edges. Nine observers judged the relative
strengths of the illusory disks in Fig. 11.
11.1. Results
In the paired comparison task all observers perceived
relatively strong illusory figures in all the stimuli in this
experiment. However, differences in the mean magni-
tude ratings for the stimuli in Fig. 11, shown in Fig. 12,
were still significant (F(4, 40)=4.97, P0.01). Fig. 11c
produced somewhat stronger ratings that the others.
11.2. Discussion
Since relatively strong illusory disks can be seen in
Fig. 11, it appears that changes in contrast—even
reversals of contrast-polarity within an inducer—do
not inhibit the perception of an illusory figure in com-
parison to stimuli with inducers of homogeneous lumi-
nance. In fact, the illusory disk in Fig. 11c was rated as
the strongest. This might be explained by the fact that
each inducer in Fig. 11c–d has three terminating con-
tours along the boundary of the illusory disk, whereas
the inducers in Fig. 11a–b have only two. Furthermore,
the additional terminating contours in Fig. 11c have
black-to-white contrast, whereas the other terminating
contours, as well as those in the Fig. 11a–b, have lower
contrast. It is well-known that IC strength increases
with the magnitude of the contrast of colinear contours.
It is plausible that IC strength might also increase with
the magnitude of the contrast of transversely terminat-
ing contours.
Spehar (2000) showed that Fig. 13a produces a rela-
tively weak IC compared to Fig. 13b. Although the
inducers in Fig. 13a do not appear to be composed of
overlapping surfaces (as do the inducers in Fig. 8a and
Fig. 9a,b), this IC may be weak for a different reason:
As suggested by Spehar (2000), it may be that vision
interprets the coincidental terminations of the black-to-
white contours at the corners of the potential illusory
square as an unlikely, ‘accidental’ arrangement for oc-
clusion (Albert, 1992; Albert & Hoffman, 2000). The
reemergence of the illusory square in Fig. 13b, where
these coincidental terminations have been removed,
supports this explanation. This ‘coincidence’ factor
might also contribute to the reduced IC strength seen in
Fig. 8a and Fig. 9a,b. However, in addition to the
coincidence factor, the weakness of the ICs in the latter
stimuli can be explained in terms of the weak version of
the IS hypothesis, as described above. Indeed, the illu-
sory squares in these stimuli appear weaker than the
one seen in Fig. 13a.
12. Experiment 5
In a final experiment, we used an alternate method
for ‘clamping’ the perception of overlapping surfaces in
the inducers in Fig. 4b,d. In Fig. 14d,e we outlined the
overlapping surfaces rather than giving them different
colours. Nine observers judged the strengths of the
illusory squares. The data show that this manipulation
also reduced the strengths of the illusory squares, al-
though not as much as when the overlapping surfaces
were given different colours (Fig. 14a,b). Perhaps the
perception of overlapping surfaces is more salient in
Fig. 14a,b than it is in Fig. 14d,e.
12.1. General discussion
To summarise, Experiments 1 and 2 were designed to
test the strong version of the IS hypothesis (Williams &
Rubin, 1998) that illusory figures are weaker with ho-
mogeneous inducers that are perceived as consisting of
overlapping surfaces (other factors being equal). The
results of these two experiments suggest that the strong
Fig. 11. The stimuli used in Experiment 4.
Fig. 12. Results for Experiment 4.
Fig. 13. (a) A relatively weak IC is seen. (b) A relatively strong IC is
seen (after Spehar, 2000).
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Fig. 14. Results for Experiment 5.
IS hypothesis is false. Experiments 3 and 5 were de-
signed to investigate whether the stimuli in Experiment
1 (Fig. 4a–d) might create some degree of bistability
between the percepts of: (1) a central illusory square;
and (2) inducers composed of overlapping surfaces.
This possibility was tested by attempting to ‘clamp’
percept (2) using ‘explicit’ overlapping surfaces of dif-
ferent colours (Experiment 3), or outlining the overlap-
ping surfaces (Experiment 5). Both of these
manipulations reduced the strengths of the central illu-
sory squares relative to the stimuli with inducers of
homogenous colour. These results are consistent with
the hypothesis that some degree of bistability is present
in the stimuli of Experiment 1. It therefore showed that
percepts (1) and (2) might indeed be ‘incompatible’ for
the visual system, in the sense that they are generally
not simultaneously strongly perceived. This hypothesis
was described as a weak version of the IS hypothesis.
The general principle at stake here is the ‘one-sidedness’
of border-ownership. The presence of bistability in the
stimuli of Experiment 1 (Fig. 4) would mean that the
experimental results do not falsify this principle. Exper-
iment 4 was designed as a control for Experiment 3.
Specifically, it tested the possibility that the central
illusory squares in Fig. 8a and Fig. 9a,b were weak
because of the non-uniform colour of the inducers per
se. The results showed that this was false.
The weak IS hypothesis is consistent with cognitive
theories of IC perception (Gregory, 1972; Rock &
Anson, 1979). On the other hand, there is considerable
evidence that neural correlates of IC perception are
present at relatively low-levels of the visual system (e.g.
von der Heydt, Peterhans, & Baumgartner, 1984), and
that IC perception can be obligatory. Ramachandran,
Ruskin, Cobb, Rogers-Ramachandran, and Tyler
(1994) showed that strong ICs and enhancement of
physically defined contours are obtained when IC stim-
uli are presented over a ‘checkerboard’ background and
the inducing edges of the IC stimulus are aligned with
check boundaries, although these percepts seem to lack
ecologically validity. When the inducers are not aligned
with the boundaries of the checks no illusory square is
seen, however there is still some enhancement of the
checks closest to the imaginary square defined by the
inducers. This might be viewed as a rather illogical
percept, suggesting that IC perception is insulated from
high-level influences. On the other hand, the percept in
this case is much weaker than when the inducers are
aligned with check boundaries. Similarly, Anderson and
Barth (1999) showed a motion/line-ending induced IC
that challenged the claim that ICs were a generated as
a way for the visual system to ‘explain’ otherwise
unexplained image structure (e.g. to explain regular
arrangements of line-endings by inferring that they are
due to occlusion by an extended illusory surface). A
static example that makes a similar point is shown in
Fig. 15. However, as in Anderson and Barth (1999), the
illusory transparent disk seen in Fig. 15 is only present
for low levels of contrast between the irregular gray
blob and the background. Therefore, it might be sug-
gested that these examples simply demonstrate ‘graceful
degradation’ of IC perception: small changes in image
structure, such as image geometry or luminance rela-
tions, give rise to gradual rather than abrupt changes in
IC perception. If this suggestion is correct, then one
might still argue that IC perception is ‘approximately’
consistent with what would be expected based on top-
down constraints, including cognition. The results of
Experiments 3, 4, and 5 lend further support to the
claim for high-level, or high-level-like influences on IC
perception. However, graceful degradation does not
seem to explain the enhanced ICs of Ramachandran et
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Fig. 15. A relatively strong transparent disk is seen even though
occlusion by the irregular gray blob already ‘accounts for’ the line-
endings. As in Anderson and Barth (1999), this suggests that a theory
of ICs based on a cognitive-style requirement to ‘explain’ otherwise
unexplained image structure cannot be strictly correct.
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al. (1994) in the case where the inducing edges are
aligned with check boundaries.
Finally, the weak illusory surfaces generated in Fig.
8a, and Fig. 9a,b in Experiment 3 do not appear to be
predicted by existing neural models of vision, since
these stimuli should be capable of producing strong
‘colinear’ IC induction (Grossberg & Mingolla, 1985).
Our findings suggest that these models need to take
account of the influence of border-ownership on visual
contour and surface perception.
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